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PERMITTING EMPLOYERS TO VIOLATE
EMPLOYEES' CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE GRIFFIN v. ELLER* EXEMPTION
FROM WASHINGTON'S LAW
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
Jonathan A. Moskowitz**
The right to be free from discrimination because of race,
creed, color, national origin, [and] sex ... is recognized
as and declared to be a civil right. This right shall include,
but not be limited to: . .. [t]he right to obtain and hold
employment without discrimination;1
[Nothing contained in the law against discrimination] shall
... be construed to deny the right to any person to
institute any action or pursue any civil or criminal remedy
based upon an alleged violation of his or her civil rights.2
Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act
in violation of [the law against discrimination] shall have
a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin
further violations, or to recover the actual damages
sustained by the person, or both ... 3
922 P.2d 788 (Wash. 1996).
Brooklyn Law School Class of 1999; B.A., University at Albany, State
University of New York, 1989. The author dedicates this Comment to his
parents, whose support and encouragement are limitless. The author extends a
special thanks to his brother Ken for being such a supportive mentor.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1)(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
2 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020.
3 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2).
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INTRODUCTION
Washington state's law against discrimination confers on all its
citizens an unequivocal right to be free of discrimination and to
seek redress through private actions for discriminatory acts
committed by their employers.4 However, in a decision that
establishes a disturbing precedent, the Washington Supreme Court
held in Griffin v Eller5 that employers of fewer than eight
employees are exempt from the ambit of the state's law against
discrimination.6 The Griffin court granted employers of fewer than
eight employees immunity from the remedies contained in the
statute, despite the statute's explicit language conferring a right to
private action to all Washington citizens who allege that their
employers have discriminated against them.7 The Griffin holding
resulted in a deprivation of the right of a significant percentage of
employees in the state to protect against violations of their civil
rights, or even seek redress for such violations, simply because they
are employed by companies with fewer than eight employees.8
4 See supra text accompanying notes 1-3 (quoting id. §§ 49.60.030(l)(a),
49.60.020, 49.60.030(2), which confer an unequivocal right on every Washington
citizen to be free of discrimination and to pursue a private action to protect his
or her civil rights).
' 922 P.2d 788 (Wash. 1996).
6 Id. at 789 (holding that "employers of fewer than eight employees are
statutorily exempt from [the] remedies provided under [the law against
discrimination]" and that "the exemption passes constitutional muster").
7 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998)).
8 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 792. The court stated that "[a]pproximately 75 percent
of business establishments in Washington have fewer than nine employees,"
accounting for "about 17.5 percent of the private employee work force." Id.
(citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS 1992:
WASHINGTON, CPB 92-49 (1994)). Explaining the Washington Legislature's
likely motivation for exempting a significant percentage of businesses in the state
from the remedies contained in the law against discrimination, the court reasoned
that the "[s]tate has a substantial interest in the well-being of small business with
regard to the state economy, tax base, and opportunities for employment." Id. See
also Ferdinand M. De Leon & Lily Eng, Court Linits Job Sex-Bias
Cases-Firms with Fewer Than 8 Workers Exempt From State Law, SEATTLE
GRIFFIN v. ELLER
The Washington Supreme Court's holding in Griffin effectively
authorizes executives and managers of companies with fewer than
eight employees to discriminate arbitrarily against their employ-
ees.9 By holding that such employers are exempt from the reme-
dies contained in the law against discrimination, the court insulated
these employers from liability for discriminatory conduct that
would otherwise be prohibited by the law against discrimination.'°
The court's holding also violates the privileges and immunities
clause of Washington's Constitution, which states that "[n]o law
shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or
corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or
corporations.""
This Comment criticizes the holding of the Washington
Supreme Court in Griffin by illustrating its deleterious impact on
the civil rights of employees in companies with fewer than eight
employees. Part I analyzes the legislative history of Washington's
law against discrimination. Particular analysis is focused on the
scope and meaning of various provisions of the Washington statute
applicable to the controversy in Griffin. Part II discusses the facts
and procedural history of Griffin and the Washington Supreme
Court's erroneous interpretation of the statute. Further, Part II
illustrates how the Griffin court's holding deprives individuals
employed in companies with fewer than eight employees of the
defense of their civil rights pursuant to the law against discrimina-
tion. Part III discusses Griffin's limiting effect on the state
constitution's privileges and immunities clause, which protects the
right of citizens to redress discrimination in private actions pursuant
to the law against discrimination. This Comment concludes that all
Washington citizens employed in companies with fewer than eight
employees possess an unequivocal right to pursue private actions to
protect their civil rights. Moreover, this Comment asserts that by
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at B1 (stating that "[a]bout 300,000 of the state's 2.3
million workers-13 percent-work for companies with fewer than 10 employ-
ees").
9 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
'o Id. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.
" WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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granting immunity from the law's remedial measures to employers
of fewer than eight employees, the Washington Supreme Court
misinterpreted the law against discrimination, and in doing so, has
established a disturbing precedent.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF WASHINGTON'S
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW' 2
Washington's law against discrimination was enacted to prevent
discrimination based on "race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or
the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability."'
3
Among the rights protected by statute is the right to "obtain and
hold employment without discrimination."' 4
The statute confers a general right to redress alleged acts of
discrimination by providing any person who alleges to be a victim
of discriminatory acts a right to bring a private civil action to
prevent further violations or recover damages."5 While the law
against discrimination was enacted in 1949,16 the general right to
pursue a private cause of action was not conferred on Washington
citizens until 1957.17
In its 1957 amendment to the law against discrimination, the
Washington Legislature conferred a general right to pursue a
private action by adding to the statute the following language: "Nor
12 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.
'3 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
"4 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1)(a). Other rights protected in the
statute include "[lt]he right to the full enjoyment... of any place of public...
accommodation . . .; [t]he right to engage in real estate ... [and] credit
transactions...; [t]he right to engage in insurance transactions or transactions
with health maintenance organizations" and "[t]he right to engage in commerce
free from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists." Id. § 49.60.030(1)(b)-(f).
Further, the statute states that the right to be free from discrimination "shall
include, but not be limited to" the specific acts of discrimination listed in the
statute. Id. § 49.60.030(1).
15 See supra text accompanying note 3 (quoting id. § 49.60.030(2)).
16 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (1949 Wash. Laws, ch. 183, § 1).
'7 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 800 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting) (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020, amended by 1957
Wash. Laws, ch. 37, § 2).
GRIFFIN v. ELLER
shall anything herein contained be construed to deny the right of
any person to institute any action or pursue any civil or criminal
remedy based upon an alleged violation of his or her civil
rights."' 8 The expansive scope of the right to pursue a private
action was elucidated in a 1973 amendment to the statute, which
made clear that "private statutory actions to enforce the civil right
to be free of discrimination in any of the areas mentioned"' 9 in
the statute were remedies available to all individuals alleging such
discrimination.20
Prior to the enactment of these amendments, the only remedy
afforded by the law against discrimination was the right to seek
administrative relief through the state's Human Rights Commis-
sion.2' Today, however, the right to seek administrative relief for
claims of employment discrimination is limited to those individuals
who allege that their "employers" have committed "unfair practic-
es" pursuant to the definitions of these terms contained in the
"8 Id. at 800 n.6 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.020).
'9 Id. at 800-01 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 801 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2) (West 1990 &
Supp. 1998)). Section 49.60.030(2) provides that:
Any person deeming himself or herself injured by any act in violation
of this chapter shall have a civil action in a court of competent
jurisdiction to enjoin further violations, or to recover the actual
damages sustained by the person, or both, together with the cost of suit
including reasonable attorneys' fees or any other appropriate remedy
authorized by this chapter or the United States Civil Rights Act of
1964 ....
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2).
2" Griffin, 922 P.2d at 799 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (stating that "[t]he
1949 Act did not create a private right of action to redress discrimination in
employment"). See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (creating the
Washington Human Rights Commission and granting it the authority to enact
rules and regulations to enforce the provisions of the law against discrimination).
Prior to the 1957 amendment of the law against discrimination, section
49.60.120(4) of the statute linked the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Commission to the adjudication of "complaints alleging 'discrimination in
employment."' Griffin, 922 P.2d at 800 (referring to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.120(4)).
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statute.2" "Employer" is defined by the law against discrimination
as "any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly, who employs eight or more persons, and does not
include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for
private profit."23 Accordingly, citizens of Washington who work
in companies with fewer than eight employees are prevented from
seeking relief through the Commission for employment discrimina-
tion they allege to have suffered.24 It is apparent, however, that
through its 1957 amendment of the law against discrimination, the
Washington Legislature intended to provide all Washington citizens
with the means to redress alleged violations of their civil rights
through private actions, regardless of the size of the company in
which they worked.25
22 Section 49.60.180(1)-(3) of the statute declares that "[i]t is an unfair
practice for any employer" to discriminate against any person "because of age,
sex, marital status, race, creed, color, national origin or the presence of any
sensory, mental, or physical disability" in decisions related to "hire," "discharge,"
"compensation" or "other terms or conditions of employment." WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(l)-(3). See Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 693 P.2d
708, 711 (Wash. 1985) (holding that claims of sexual harassment are actionable
under the law against discrimination). The statute further states that it is an
"unfair practice" for an employer to "print, or circulate ... any statement,
advertisement, or publication, or to use any form of application for employment,
or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective employment, which
expresses any limitation, specification, or discrimination" based on the
aforementioned factors. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(4). Pursuant to
section 49.60.120(4) of the law against discrimination, Washington's Human
Rights Commission is empoweredtoday "[t]o receive, impartially investigate, and
pass upon complaints alleging unfair practices as defined in this chapter." WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.120(4).
23 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(3).
24 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to adjudicate charges of
employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of "employer" and "unfair
practices" contained in the law against discrimination, pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(l)-(4)); supra text accompanying note
23 (discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.040(3)).
25 See Griffin, 922 P.2d at 800 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Legislature's amendment conferring a general right to pursue a private action to
protect one's civil rights coincided with the expansion of the statute's coverage
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Further evidence of the Legislature's intent to create a broad
right of private action can be found in the 1957 amendment of the
statutory provision defining the powers and duties of the Human
Rights Commission.26 The amendment narrowed the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction, which had included adjudication of charges of
"discrimination in employment," by limiting its authority to
adjudication of charges of "unfair practices as defined in [the law
against discrimination]. ' '27 This amendment suggests that it was
the Legislature's intent to narrow the Commission's enforcement
authority and differentiate it from the broad right of private action
conferred on Washington citizens.2" Moreover, the amendment, in
redefining the authority of the Human Rights Commission,
illustrates that the Legislature's likely purpose was to ensure that
the "definitions of unfair practices would not be used to limit the
availability of private rights of action for discrimination."2 9 With
regard to the Legislature's intent in enacting the small business
to prohibit the commission of unfair practices in public housing and public
accommodations). The court further stated that by amending the law against
discrimination in 1957, "[t]he Legislature clearly indicated a private right of
action for discrimination and administrative remedies for unfair practices were
distinct" and "for the first time ... recognized the existence of a private right
of action to redress ... discrimination." Id. See supra text accompanying note
2 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020, which grants a broad right to
private action); supra text accompanying note 1 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.030(1)(a), which recognizes as a civil right "[t]he right to obtain
and hold employment without discrimination").
26 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 800 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (discussing WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. 49.60.120(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998), amended by 1957
Wash. Laws, ch. 37, § 7)).
27 Id. (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.120(4), which established the present authority of the Human Rights
Commission "[t]o receive, impartially investigate, and pass upon complaints
alleging unfair practices as defined in this chapter," amending the authority
originally conferred on the Commission to "investigate, and pass upon
'complaints alleging discrimination in employment"').
28 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.120(4) and the power conferred on the Human Rights Commission
to adjudicate charges of discrimination pursuant to the definition of "unfair
practices" contained in the law against discrimination).
29 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 800 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
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exemption, the majority in Griffin merely noted that there was "no
legislative history suggesting the purpose of the new statutory
private remedy was to permit a statutory cause of action against
small, otherwise exempt, employers."3
It is reasonable to conclude that through its 1957 amendments
of the law against discrimination, the Washington Legislature
intended to distinguish "unfair practices" from other acts of
discrimination in order to delineate the limited right to seek
administrative relief and the broad right to pursue private civil
actions.3' Moreover, amending the statute in 1973 to establish a
right to private action for all individuals who allege that they were
discriminated against, rather than adding language conferring that
right narrowly on individuals who allege themselves to be victims
of "unfair practices,"32 indicates that the Legislature intended to
"open the courts more generally to discrimination complaints., 33
30 Id. at 790.
31 Id. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to adjudicate charges of
employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of "employer" and "unfair
practices" contained in the law against discrimination, pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(l)-(4)).
32 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 801 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
33 Id. See supra text accompanying note 3 (quoting the 1973 amendment of
the law against discrimination, which elucidated the breadth of the Washington
courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of discrimination, WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.030(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998)). Further support for the
contention that the statute confers a broad right to private action to redress
discrimination may be found in the expansive list of civil rights protected by the
statute, including the right to: "obtain and hold employment without discrimina-
tion; full enjoyment of any ... place of public ... accommodation; engage in
credit transactions without discrimination; engage in insurance transactions or
transactions with health maintenance organizations; engage in commerce free
from any discriminatory boycotts or blacklists." WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.030(l)(a)-(f); see Griffin, 922 P.2d at 801 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
Moreover, by stating that the "right to be free from discrimination shall include,
but not be limited to" acts listed in the statute, the Legislature left open the
possibility that other acts of discrimination may be covered by the statute. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1). If instead, the Legislature had amended the
statute to grant a right to private action only to those individuals who allege
themselves to be victims of "unfair practices" pursuant to the statutory definition
of that term, it would have limited the ability of Washington citizens to protect
GRIFFIN v. ELLER
The history of the law against discrimination illustrates that the
Washington Legislature intended to ensure that the right to pursue
a private action to defend one's civil rights was readily available to
all Washington citizens, while the availability of administrative
remedies was confined to citizens employed in companies with
eight or more employees.34
II. THE GRIFFIN COURT'S ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAW AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
A. The Facts and Procedural History
Appellant Sharon Griffin was hired by attorney Carson Eller,
a solo practitioner, as a legal secretary on September 20, 1990.35
Griffin was Eller's only full-time employee, and at no time did
Eller employ eight or more individuals.36 Eller terminated
Griffin's employment on July 15, 1991, claiming that he could not
afford to continue employing her.37
Griffin claimed that Eller subjected her to repeated sexual
harassment, and in doing so, created a hostile work environment.38
their civil rights, because access to the courts would be confined only to the
discriminatory conduct identified by the Legislature as "unfair practices." Griffin,
922 P.2d at 801 (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
14 Id. (Talmadge, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 789.
36 Id.
37 id.
38 Id. The Washington Supreme Court held, in Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., that in order to establish a prima facie case that an employer created a
hostile work environment as a result of sexual harassment, a complainant must
prove the following four elements:
(1) The harassment was unwelcome ... in the sense that the plaintiff-
employee did not solicit or incite it, and ... regarded the conduct as
undesirable or offensive.
(2) . .. [t]he gender of the plaintiff-employee [was] the motivating
factor for the unlawful discrimination.
(3) The harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment
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Griffin further alleged that because she objected to the sexual
remarks made by Eller, Eller retaliated by terminating her employ-
ment.39 Griffin also claimed that she was subjected to disparate
treatment, as Eller penalized her for her protestations to his sexual
remarks by denying her dental benefits and paid vacations, and
assigning her duties to other employees.4"
Griffin brought suit against Eller in Superior Court, Pierce
County, Washington, alleging that Eller violated the state's law
against discrimination by sexually harassing her and retaliating
against her for objecting to such harassment. 41 Her suit also
included claims that Eller violated public policy by wrongfully
terminating her and failing to pay her wages, 42 as well as claims
(4) The harassment is imputed to the employer . .. . The employee
must show that the employer ... authorized, knew, or should have
known of the harassment and ... failed to take reasonably prompt and
adequate corrective action.
693 P.2d 708, 712 (Wash. 1985).
3' Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. In order to prove that an employer discharged
an employee in retaliation for her opposition to conduct prohibited by the law
against discrimination, the Washington Supreme Court has held that the
employee must show that she opposed practices prohibited by the statute; "she
was discharged or some other adverse employment action was taken against her;
and there is a causal connection between the opposition and the discharge."
Graves v. Department of Game, 887 P.2d 424, 427 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Allison v. Housing Auth., 799 P.2d 1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), aff'd,
821 P.2d 34 (Wash. 1991)).
" Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. The Washington Supreme Court held in E-Z
Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. that in order to prove a
claim of disparate treatment, a party must show that "an employer treated an
individual employee or group of employees differently because of sex, race, age,
religion or some other improper differentiation." 726 P.2d 439, 444 (Wash.
1986). The improper differentiation underlying the disparate treatment allegedby
Griffin was based on her gender and her objections to Eller's sexual advances.
Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
" Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. See Glasgow, 693 P.2d at 711 (holding that
sexual harassment is "actionable under this state's Law Against Discrimination"
because it "unfairly handicaps an employee against whom it is directed in his or
her work performance and as such is a barrier to sexual equality in the
workplace").
42 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
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alleging outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress.43
In response to Eller's motion for summary judgment, the trial court
granted partial summary judgment, dismissing Griffin's claims for
sexual harassment and retaliation filed under the state's law against
discrimination.44
41 Id. In order to prevail on a cause of action based on outrage, the
Washington Supreme Court held in Grimsby v. Samson that a plaintiff must
prove the following elements:
First, the emotional distress must be inflicted Intentionally [sic] or
recklessly; mere negligence is not enough. Second, the conduct of the
defendant must be Outrageous [sic] and extreme. . . . Liability exists
'only where the conduct has been So (sic] outrageous in character, and
so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community'.. . . [L]iability in the tort of outrage 'does not extend to
mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or
other trivialities'. . . . Third, the conduct must result in Severe [sic]
emotional distress to the plaintiff.
530 P.2d 291, 295 (Wash. 1975) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(1965)). The plaintiff in Grimsby sued his deceased wife's physician for outrage,
alleging that the physician's negligence and recklessness causedplaintiff to suffer
"severe damage" by "requir[ing him] to witness the terrifying agony and explicit
pain and suffering of his [dying] wife." Id. at 292. Reversing the trial court's
dismissal of the action and remanding for further proceedings, the Grimsby court
held that plaintiff "had a cause of action." Id. at 295-96. See also Rice v.
Janovich, 742 P.2d 1230, 1238 (Wash. 1987) (identifying the elements of the tort
of outrage as "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intentional or reckless
infliction of emotional distress; and (3) actual result to the plaintiff of severe
emotional distress").
The Washington Supreme Court held further in Hunsley v. Giard that in a
cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
show that her "mental distress ... [is] the reaction of a normally constituted
person, absent defendant's knowledge of some peculiar characteristic or condition
of plaintiff." 553 P.2d 1096, 1103 (Wash. 1976) (relying on Rodrigues v. State,
472 P.2d 509, 512 (Haw. 1970)). The plaintiff in Hunsley claimed that she was
caused emotional distress when her neighbor negligently crashed her car into the
plaintiff's home while plaintiff was sitting in her living room. 553 P.2d at 1097.
44 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. For her outrage and negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims, Griffin was awarded $50,000. Id.
To prevail in actions based on outrage and negligent infliction of emotional
distress, the burden of proof is high and may be difficult for some complainants
to meet. See supra note 43 (discussing the elements a plaintiff must prove in
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B. A Faulty Analysis of Statutory Provisions
In affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment
and dismissing Griffin's statutory claims for sexual harassment and
order to recover damages based on claims of outrage and negligent infliction of
emotional distress). Griffin, however, was able to prevail on these claims. Griffin,
922 P.2d at 789. With regard to the egregious nature of the harassment she
endured, Griffin asserted that:
Eller daily made offensive sexual comments to her, relatingjokes about
prostitutes and descriptions of different races' genitalia .... [O]n her
birthday, Eller allegedly told her 'every woman needs to be big
dicked,' and, for her birthday present, he was going to photograph her
being 'big dicked' by his friend.
Id. at 794. While Griffin was able to prove the elements necessary for these tort
actions due to the flagrant nature of the harassment to which she was subjected,
other plaintiffs complaining of similar discriminatory conduct may not be as
successful in their claims. See Ferdinand M. De Leon & Lily Eng, Court Limits
Job Sex-Bias Cases-Firms with Fewer Than 8 Workers Exempt From State Law,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 6, 1996, at BI (quoting Marilyn Endriss, Griffin's
attorney, who stated that as a result of the Griffin court's holding, the only
recourse for complainants such as Griffin would be to prove a "'claim of
outrage,' which requires 'conduct so outrageous that it's beyond decency and
what's acceptable in civilized society'). Because the burden of proving these tort
claims is considerably high, it follows that other plaintiffs seeking recourse for
alleged civil rights violations would be required to prove that they were subjected
to conduct similarly egregious to that exhibited by Griffin's employer. Griffin,
922 P.2d at 794. See also supra note 43 (discussing Hunsley, 553 P.2d at 436,
and Grimsby, 530 P.2d at 295, and the elements that must be proven in order to
prevail on claims of outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress).
Consequently, it is reasonable to conclude that if the discrimination alleged in
other cases is not as patently egregious as that suffered by Griffin, other
plaintiffs with meritorious claims may be unable to prevail in their actions based
on outrage and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Griffin, 922 P.2d at
794. As a result, those plaintiffs who work in companies with fewer than eight
employees and fail to prove the requisite elements for these tort claims would be
foreclosed completely from redressing alleged violations of their civil rights,
because, pursuant to the court's holding in Griffin, they would be barred from
bringing a private action under the law against discrimination. See Griffin, 922
P.2d at 789 (holding that "employers of fewer than eight employees are
statutorily exempt from [the] remedies provided under [the law against
discrimination]").
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retaliation,45 the Washington Supreme Court misinterpreted the
statutory provision defining "employer,, 46 and misconstrued the
purpose of exempting companies with fewer than eight employees
from the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission.4 1 Conse-
quently, the Griffin court misapplied the statute's limiting provi-
sions, which apply only to the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Commission, and, in doing so, impermissibly deprived an individu-
al of the unequivocal right to pursue a private action to redress
alleged discrimination.48
Concluding that Griffin's employer was exempt from the ambit
of the law against discrimination, the court held that "no legislative
history suggest[ed that] the purpose of the new statutory private
remedy was to permit a statutory cause of action against small,
otherwise exempt, employers., 49 Another determinative factor for
45 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 793.
46 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of
"employer" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(3) (West 1990 &
Supp. 1998)).
47 The Washington Administrative Code states that:
The principal purposes of exempting persons who employ less than
eight from the enforcement authority of the commission are: (a) To
relieve small businesses of a regulatory burden; and (b) In the interest
of cost effectiveness, to confine public agency enforcement of the law
to employers whose practices affect a substantial number of persons.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-160(2) (1997). See Griffin, 922 P.2d at 802
(Talmadge, J. dissenting) (stating that "the exemption only confines public
agency enforcement of the law, and does not restrict the scope of the law itself").
" Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789 (holding that "employers of fewer than eight
employees are statutorily exempt from [the] remedies provided under [WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60]"). The statutory provisions that were misapplied by
the Griffin court are those which limit the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Commission to the adjudication to those claims that allege the commission of
"unfair practices" by "employers." See supra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing the limited jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to
adjudicate charges of employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of
"employer" and "unfair practices" contained in the law against discrimination,
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(l)-(4); supra
text accompanying note 23 (discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 40.60.040(3)).
49 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 790.
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the Griffin court was its analysis of the administrative code
regulation interpreting the purpose of the small business exemp-
tion." The court reasoned that the term "'principal purposes"' in
the exemption was intended to "relieve small businesses of a
regulatory burden and conserve state resources."'" Moreover, the
Grffin court asserted that the regulation characterizing the narrow
definition of "employer" functioned as an exemption from the
statute's prohibition against discriminatory conduct. 2
Pursuant to the law against discrimination, Washington's
Human Rights Commission is empowered to adjudicate complaints
alleging unfair practices committed by employers. 3 The statute
confines the jurisdiction of the Commission to investigating and
acting on complaints of unfair practices allegedly committed by
employers who meet the statute's eight-employee threshold. 4
The statute, however, is devoid of any language that extends the
eight-employee threshold governing the jurisdiction of the Human
Rights Commission to prevent "[a]ny person deeming himself or
herself injured"55 by an act of discrimination from pursuing a civil
action in court.5 6 Thus, there is no statutory authority that justifies
limiting the right of employees in companies with fewer than eight
employees to pursue private actions to redress alleged acts of
discrimination.
50 Id. at 792 (interpreting WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-160).
Id. (referring to WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-160).
52 id.
13 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.120(4) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998)
(establishing the power of the Human Rights Commission "[t]o receive,
impartially investigate, and pass upon complaints alleging unfair practices
[committed by an employer] as defined in this chapter").
14 Id. See also supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to adjudicate charges of
employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of "employer" and "unfair
practices" contained in the law against discrimination, pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § § 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(1)-(4); supra text accompanying note 23
(discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.040(3)).
" See supra note 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2)).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2), which confer an unequivocal right on all
Washington citizens to pursue private actions to defend their civil rights).
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As a result of its suspect statutory analysis, the court in Griffin
extended the eight-employee threshold governing the jurisdiction of
the state Human Rights Commission to bar all employees of
companies with fewer than eight employees from pursuing private
actions to redress alleged assaults on their civil rights.57 The
consequence of the Griffin court's holding is to grant to companies
with fewer than eight employees a license to capriciously and
arbitrarily discriminate against their employees because, pursuant
to the powerful message conveyed in the Griffin holding, these
employers will not be held accountable for their discriminatory
conduct under the law against discrimination.5 8 Undoubtedly, that
is a disturbing policy to set.
C. A Frustration of Statutory Purpose
By misconstruing the limiting provisions of the law against
discrimination, the court in Griffin frustrated the statute's express
purpose as an "exercise of the police power of the state for the
protection of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of
this state, and in fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of
this state concerning civil rights."59
Yet, in Burnside v Simpson Paper Co., the Washington
Supreme Court established clear objectives concerning statutory
interpretation that require courts to interpret statutes "to further, not
frustrate, their intended purpose."6 In an illustration of this
policy, the Burnside court held that the inclusion of the word
"inhabitant" in the law against discrimination did not preclude
Washington courts from adjudicating actions alleging age discrimi-
nation brought by individuals who were not residents of the state
against companies that were Washington residents.6' In Burnside,
the Washington Supreme Court concurred with the reasoning
17 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789 (Wash. 1996).
58 Id.
'9 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
60 864 P.2d 937, 940 (Wash. 1994) (adjudicating a wrongful termination and
age discrimination claim filed by a former employee against his employer under
the law against discrimination).
61 id.
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applied by the Court of Appeals of Washington in its disposition of
the case.62 The Court of Appeals concluded that limiting the
statute's application to "Washington inhabitants . . . would
effectively allow Washington employers to discriminate freely
against non-Washington inhabitants, thus undermining the funda-
mental purpose of the act, deterring discrimination. ' '63 Because
this reasoning furthered the legislative purpose of the law against
discrimination, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals' holding in Burnside.64
There is no apparent reason that the policy established in
Burnside, demonstrating the value the court placed on furthering
the purpose of the law against discrimination, was not extended to
Griffin. Although fulfillment of the statute's purpose should have
been no less a priority in Griffin than it was in Burnside, it appears
that the Griffin court was less concerned with furthering the
purpose of, and the policy underlying, the law against discrimina-
tion.
61
Further, the Washington Supreme Court previously held that, in
addition to interpreting statutes to "effect their purposes, '"66
statutes ought to be construed "to avoid an unlikely or strained
consequence. ' ,67 Any holding that deprives individuals of the right
62 Id. (affirming the holding of the Court of Appeals of Washington, 832
P.2d 537, 543 (Wash. 1992), which stated that "[t]here is ... no basis consistent
with the purposes of the [law against discrimination] ... for concluding that the
reference to 'inhabitants' is intended as a jurisdictional limitation on a court's
power to hear cases regarding age discrimination").
63 Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 832 P. 2d 537, 543 (Wash. 1992)
(referring to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010).
64 Burnside, 864 P.2d at 940.
6' Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 790 (Wash. 1996) (stating that "[t]here is
no legislative history suggesting the purpose of the new statutory remedy was to
permit a statutory cause of action against small, otherwise exempt, employers").
66 State v. Mierz, 901 P.2d 286, 296 (Wash. 1995).
61 Id. In Mierz, the Washington Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a citizen's possession of two coyote puppies violated the state statute
criminalizing possession of "wildlife." Id. at 287, 296-97. See WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 77.16.040 (West 1996) (providing that "it is unlawful to bring into this
state, offer for sale, sell, possess, exchange, buy, transport, or ship wildlife");
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 77.08.010(16) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (defining
wildlife as "all species of the animal kingdom whose members exist in
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to protect themselves from alleged assaults on their civil rights is
at odds with the law against discrimination and its purpose of
protecting "the public welfare .. .of the people of this state...
concerning civil rights.-6 8 By affirming the trial court's partial
summary judgment, which extinguished Griffin's statutory claims
for sexual harassment and retaliation,69 the Washington Supreme
Court failed to accomplish the purpose of the law against discrimi-
nation. Consequently, the Griffin court frustrated the statute's
purpose, and its decision resulted in an impermissible "unlikely
[and] strained consequence. "70
Washington in a wild state"). The Mierz court reasoned that because the purpose
of the statute was to "'preserve, protect, and perpetuate wildlife,"' catching
coyote puppies and keeping them as pets violated the statute. Mierz, 901 P.2d at
296 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 77.12.010 (West 1996)). The court in
Mierz rejected defendant's argument that the statute's use of the term "feral
domestic mammals" as an exception to the definition of "wildlife" applied to the
coyote puppies, since the term referred to "individual members of domestic
species."Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 77.08.010(16)). In repudiating the
defendant's argument, the court held that "individual 'domesticated' members of
a wild species," such as the coyote puppies taken by the defendant, "would not
be protected and could be possessed or taken with impunity" under such an
interpretation of the exception, a result that would defeat the purpose of the
wildlife code. Id. Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court in Griffin should
have applied the same reasoning to find that employers of fewer than eight
employees are not exempted from the law against discrimination. Two other
decisions of the Washington Supreme Court further extend the proposition that
statutes must be interpreted so as not to lead to absurd, unlikely or strained
consequences. See Whatcom County v. Bellingham, 909 P.2d 1303, 1308 (Wash.
1996) (holding that statutes must be interpreted "so as to effectuate the legislative
intent" and that the court must avoid a reading of a statute that "would result in
unlikely, absurd or strained consequences"); Timberline v. Bell Helicopter-
Textron, Inc., 884 P.2d 920, 927 (Wash. 1994) (noting the "principle of statutory
construction [which states] that a statute should be construed so as to avoid
unlikely, absurd, or strained consequences").
68 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
69 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 793.
7 Mierz, 901 P.2d at 296.
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D. An Excessively Broad Interpretation of the Term
"Employer" and Selective Enforcement of Statutory
Provisions
The Griffin court's erroneous holding derives from an exces-
sively broad interpretation of, and reliance on, the statutory
definition of "employer" and its misapplication of the terms
limiting the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission.7"
Affording disproportionate significance to the definition of
"employer," the Griffin court failed to properly view the statute's
limiting provisions, in relation to its enabling provisions, which
grant to every aggrieved citizen a general right to pursue a private
cause of action.72
71 See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the limited
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to adjudicate charges of
employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of "employer" and "unfair
practices" contained in the law against discrimination, pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § § 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(1)-(4); supra text accompanying note 23
(discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.040(3)).
72 In support of its holding in Griffin, the Washington Supreme Court
discussed the likely rationale of the Legislature in enacting the exemption for
employers with fewer than eight employees from the law against discrimination.
The court reasoned that because "the [s]tate has a substantial interest in the well-
being of small business with regard to the state economy, tax base, and [employ-
ment] opportunities ... the Legislature could well have concluded that burdening
so many employers to benefit so few employees was not, on balance, of
sufficient public interest to offset the burden." Griffin, 922 P.2d at 792. The
Griffin court also pointed to the state's administrative code to justify its holding
that employers of fewer than eight employees were exempt from the remedies
contained in the law against discrimination. Id. The court reasoned that the
"principal purposes" of the small business exemption "were to relieve small
businesses of a regulatory burden and conserve state resources." Id. Further, the
court stated that the administrative code "characterizesthe definition [of employ-
er] as an 'exemption' from the statute." Id. Pursuant to these conclusions reached
in Griffin, it seems as though the court narrowly focused on the rationale of, and
purposes for, these limitations without giving full effect to those statutory provi-
sions that confer an unequivocal right on every Washington citizen to pursue a
private action to protect his or her civil rights. See supra text accompanying
notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2)).
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In her appeal to the Washington Supreme Court, Griffin
suggested that the court independently read the statutory provisions
granting a right of civil action to those who deem themselves
injured by any act in violation of the law against discrimination.7 3
Rejecting this proposition, the Griffin court reasoned that the
section cannot be read independently; but rather, it must be read in
conjunction with the statutory provision that defines employer
"narrowly and exclusively."74 To justify its holding that the
statutory provision granting a private right of action cannot be read
independently, the court erroneously stated that the right to pursue
a private cause of action was not conferred on Washington citizens
until the statute was amended in 1973, and that "[t]here is no
legislative history suggesting the purpose of the new statutory
private remedy was to permit a statutory cause of action against
small, otherwise exempt, employers.175 The court failed, however,
to point to any legislative history supporting its own proposition.
7 6
73 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789 (referring to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.030(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998)).
74 1d.
75 Id. at 790. The right to pursue a private action was, in fact, conferred in
the law against discrimination in 1957 when the legislature amended the statute
with the following language: "Nor shall anything herein contained be construed
to deny the right to any person to institute any action or pursue any civil or
criminal remedy based upon an alleged violation of his or her civil rights."
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020, amended by 1957 Wash. Laws, ch. 37,
§ 2. The 1973 amendment to which the court referred essentially clarified the
expansive scope of the law against discrimination by providing that "private
statutory actions to enforce the civil right to be free of discrimination" were
remedies available to all persons who allege to be victims of discrimination.
Griffin, 922 P.2d at 800-01 (Talmadge, J., dissenting) (referring to WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2), amended by 1973 Wash. Law, ch. 141).
76 Id. at 790. The Griffin court did refer to several cases to support its
conclusion that individuals employed in companies with fewer than eight
employees are statutorily barred from seeking redress for employment discrimina-
tion under the law against discrimination. However, these cases do not adequately
support the court's reasoning. For example, the Griffin court referred to its
holding in Farnam v. CRISTA Ministries, where it held that a religious
organization was exempt from the remedies contained in law against discrimina-
tion because such organizations are not considered "employers" pursuant to the
law against discrimination. Id. (citing Farnam, 807 P.2d 830 (Wash. 1991)). See
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(3) (excluding from the definition of
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In an apparent contradiction, the Griffin court engaged in the
same flawed analysis it claimed to have rejected, as it narrowly
focused on the limiting provisions of the statute. Specifically, the
court relied on the definition of "employer," and its limiting effect
on the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission, to conclude
that no statutory remedy was available to Griffin. 7 The court's
analysis of the law against discrimination disregarded the plain
language of the statutory provisions that confer an undeniable right
of recourse through private action,78  creating a statutory
"employer" "any religious or sectarian organization not organized for private
profit"). Yet this reasoning fails to justify the Griffin holding in light of the
statutory provisions conferring an unequivocal right on all Washington citizens
to pursue private actions to redress discrimination. See supra text accompanying
notes 1-3 (quoting id. §§ 49.60.030(1)(a), 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2), which confer
an unequivocal right on every Washington citizen to be free of discrimination
and to pursue a private action to protect his or her civil rights). The Washington
Supreme Court also referred to its holding in Bennett v. Hardy, explaining that
in Bennett, "[w]e stated in dicta that a small employer was exempt from these
statutory remedies" because an employer who employs fewer than eight
individuals 'is not within [the] statute's definition of employer.' Griffin, 922 P.2d
at 790 (citing Bennett, 784 P.2d 1258 (Wash. 1990)). Likewise, this reference
does not illuminate the court's reasoning in Griffin. Further, the court unsuccess-
fully attempted to distinguish its holding in Griffin, which addressed "a statutory
exemption for small employers," from its decision in Marquis v. City of Spokane,
which addressed the issue of "statutory silence as to independent contractors." Id.
(referring to 922 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1996)). See infra note 139 (discussing the
court's holding in Marquis). None of these cited cases dealt with the unequivocal
right of every citizen to be free of discrimination and to seek redress for
discriminatory acts that is at the heart of the Griffin case.
" Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. See supra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing the limited jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to
adjudicate charges of employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of
"employer" and "unfair practices" contained in the law against discrimination,
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(l)-(4)); supra
text accompanying note 23 (discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(3)).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2)).
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exemption for Griffin's employer.79 Consequently, Griffin was
deprived of the rights conferred by the statute.
In light of the Washington Supreme Court's holding in State v
Malone, ° which concerned the propriety of giving intent and
purpose to all of a statute's provisions,8' the Griffin court erred in
failing to recognize Griffin's right to pursue a private action. In
Malone, the Washington Supreme Court reversed a decision
rendered by the Spokane County Superior Court, holding that the
court had a duty to "give effect to the intent and purpose of...
legislation as expressed in [an] act as a whole." '82 At issue in
Malone was whether two Washington statutes were applicable to an
automobile chase involving an Idaho police officer in
Washington.83 One of the statutes in contention deemed eluding
a "pursuing police vehicle" a class C felony, while the other statute
at issue defined "police officer.,8 4 Because neither statute con-
tained language requiring a pursuing officer to be a Washington
police officer, or indicated that the statute would not apply to
police officers or vehicles from other jurisdictions, the court held
" Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789 (Wash. 1996) (stating that at no time
did Griffin's employer ever employ more than eight persons). See supra text
accompanying note 23 (discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040(3)).
80 724 P.2d 364 (Wash. 1986).
"I See id. at 366.
82 id.
83 Id. The defendant in Malone was charged under Washington Revised Code
section 46.61.024 for attempting to elude a police vehicle in a high speed chase
that began in Idaho and ended in Washington. Malone, 724 P.2d at 365.
14 Id. at 366. Washington Revised Code section 46.61.024 states that "[a]ny
driver ... who wilfully fails or refuses to immediately [stop his vehicle]" and
drives in a dangerous manner endangering others' lives and property, "while
attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle" after being signaled to stop, "shall
be guilty of a class C felony." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.024 (West
1987). The statute states further that the officer who signals the offending driver
"shall be in uniform and his vehicle shall be appropriately marked showing it to
be an official police vehicle." Id. Section 46.04.391 defines police officer as
"every officer authorized to direct or regulate traffic or make arrests for
violations of traffic regulations." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.04.391 (West
1987).
JOURNAL OF LA W AND POLICY
that the Washington statutes applied to the Idaho police officer.85
The court concluded that the term "police officer," as used in the
statute, included an officer whose authority to make an arrest was
limited to another jurisdiction.86 Further, the court found that
"police vehicle" could also include a vehicle from another jurisdic-
tion." The Malone court reasoned that the statute's language and
legislative history demonstrated that it was enacted to prevent the
dangers associated with high-speed police chases, regardless of the
jurisdiction of the pursuing officers.88 Consequently, the court
held that the respondent's conduct "clearly [fell] into the behavior
that the Legislature intended to address when it enacted ' 89 the
law, and that holding otherwise would "undermine the purpose and
the effectiveness of [the statute]."9 The Malone court recognized
that no statutory language limited the jurisdiction to enforce these
laws to in-state police officers only 9 As a result, the court
prudently interpreted the controlling statutes and was able to fulfill
their purpose of protecting citizens from the dangers associated
with high-speed chases. 92
Similarly, the law against discrimination does not contain
language that imposes limitations on the scope of the statutory right
to pursue a private action. 93 Instead of performing the sound
statutory analysis exhibited by the Malone court,9 4 the Griffin
court failed to recognize that the language confining the jurisdiction
of the Human Rights Commission does not limit the rights of
individuals who work in companies with fewer than eight employ-
ees to pursue private actions. 95 Applying the reasoning the
85 Malone, 724 P.2d at 366.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 366-67.
93 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998)).
14 Malone, 724 P.2d at 366-67.
95 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789 (Wash. 1996). Washington's law
against discrimination places no limitation on the right of employees who work
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Washington Supreme Court exercised in Malone, it is clear that the
law against discrimination should be interpreted to confer on all
citizens of Washington the right to pursue private actions to redress
alleged acts of discrimination.96 Further, the Washington Legisla-
ture expressly stated in the statute that the law's purpose was to
safeguard the civil rights of the citizens of Washington.97 Any
interpretation of the law against discrimination that summarily
denies a citizen the right to pursue a private action to defend his or
her civil rights would, therefore, in the words of the Malone court,
"undermine the purpose and the effectiveness" of the statute.98
in companies with fewer than eight employees to pursue private actions to defend
their civil rights. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2). There are,
however, limitations on the rights of employees who work in companies with
fewer than eight employees to obtain administrative relief through the Human
Rights Commission. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the
limited jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to adjudicate charges of
employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of "employer" and "unfair
practices" contained in the law against discrimination, pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(l)-(4)); supra text accompanying note
23 (discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.040(3)). It is these limiting provisions that the court misconstrued when
it denied Griffin her right to pursue a private action. Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
96 Pursuant to the express purpose of the law against discrimination,
Washington citizens employed in companies with fewer than eight employees are
entitled to pursue private actions to remedy sexual harassment and other forms
of discrimination, since the purpose of the statute is to protect the public welfare
of Washington citizens, and to fulfill "the provisions of the [state] Constitution
... conceming civil rights." 724 P.2d at 366-67. See supra note 59 and
accompanying text (discussing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010). Moreover,
because the provisions of the law against discrimination that grant a general right
to pursue a private action do not contain language that limits in any way the
exercise of that right, see supra notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2)), it is evident that all citizens of Washington should
be entitled to pursue private actions to remedy alleged discrimination, regardless
of the size of the company in which they work.
9' See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (stating that the law against
discrimination "is an exercise of the police power of the state for the protection
of the public welfare, health, and peace of the people of this state, and in
fulfillment of the provisions of the Constitution of this state concerning civil
rights").
" Malone, 724 P.2d at 366.
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Several other holdings of the Washington Supreme Court
illustrate that the Griffin court erred by failing to give intent and
effect to all of the provisions of the law against discrimination,
repudiating the precedent previously established in these cases. For
example, in Addleman v. Board of Prison Terms and Paroles,99
the court held that when interpreting a statute, "[e]ach provision
must be viewed in relation to other provisions and harmonized if
at all possible to insure proper construction of every provi-
sion."100 The court further stated that "[s]tatutes should not be
interpreted so as to render any portion meaningless, superfluous or
questionable."' 0 ' The proposition that statutory provisions must
99 730 P.2d 1327 (Wash. 1986).
'00 id. at 1331. In Addleman, the Washington Supreme Court held that the
State Board of Prison Terms and Paroles ("Board") must determine the duration
of prison inmates' terms pursuant to the requirements set forth in the state's
Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA"). Addleman, 730 P.2d at 1331-32 (referring to
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.009(2) (West 1998)). The Addleman plaintiffs,
state prison inmates, sought application of standard sentence ranges, codified in
Washington's SRA, to crimes for which they were sentenced prior to the SRA's
effective date. Id. at 1329. Notwithstanding that the sentencing guidelines
contained in the SRA did not become effective until after plaintiffs were
sentenced for their crimes, the court concluded that "rules of statutory
construction mandate application of SRA standards to those sentenced prior" to
the SRA's effective date. Id. at 1331. The Addlenan court held that because the
SRA mandated that sentencing judges and prosecuting attorneys "shall attempt
to make decisions reasonably consistent with [the sentencing ranges contained in
the SRA]," those ranges should apply to plaintiffs and other inmates sentenced
prior to the SRA's effective date. Id. at 1332 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.95.009(2)). The court reasoned that applying the SRA guidelines to the
plaintiffs' crimes "harmonized" the SRA with other provisions of the statute
governing the Board's duties and "insure[d] proper construction of every
provision" of the SRA and the Board-governing statute. Id. at 1331 (citing
Burlington N., Inc. v. Johnston, 572 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Wash. 1977)).
Id. (citing Avlonitis v. Seattle Dist. Court, 641 P.2d 169, 173 (Wash.
1982)). See also Timberline Air Serv., Inc. v. Bell Helicopter-Textron, Inc., 884
P.2d 920, 925 (Wash. 1994) (citing Pope v. University of Wash., 852 P.2d 1055,
1061 (Wash. 1993)) (stating that "rules of statutory construction provide that
provisions in a statute are read in the context of the statute as a whole"). The
court in Timberline further stated that "'[a]ll the provisions of an act must be
considered in their relation to each other and, if possible, harmoniously construed
to insure proper construction of each provision."' d. (citing Publishers Forest
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be interpreted together in order to effectuate statutory purpose is
further illustrated by the Washington Supreme Court's holding in
Spangenberg v Cheney School District No. 30, where the court
stated that in order to interpret statutes properly and in accordance
with the legislature's intent, "statute[s] must be read as a whole;
intent is not to be determined by a single sentence ... or phrase.', 10 2
Prods. Co. v. State, 505 P.2d 453 (Wash. 1973)).
In Timberline, the court held that a manufacturer of military aircraft, which
was later converted to civilian use, could not assert the statutory government
contractor's defense, codified in WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(2) (West
1992), as an absolute defense to a postmanufacture failure-to-warn products
liability claim. Timberline Air Serv., 884 P.2d at 922, 927. The government
contractor's defense states that "[w]hen the injury-causing aspect of the product
was, at the time of manufacture, in compliance with a specific mandatory
government specification relating to design or warnings, this compliance shall be
an absolute defense." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(2). The Timberline
court reasoned that the statutory defense for government contractors provides
protection only "where the government contractor is required to design a product
in a certain way or to provide certain warnings, and the compliance with those
specifications would otherwise expose the contractor to a product liability claim."
Timberline Air Serv., 884 P.2d at 926. Interpreting the contractor's defense, see
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.050(2), in light of other provisions contained in
the state's products liability statute which explain alternate theories of manufac-
turer liability, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.030(1)(c), the court held that
granting broad immunity to government contractors in failure-to-warn actions
would undermine the other provisions of the statute that provide for "different
theories of manufacturer liability in products liability actions." Timberline Air
Serv., 884 P.2d at 925.
102 641 P.2d 163, 164 (Wash. 1982). The Washington Supreme Court held
in Spangenberg that pursuant to a proper construction of the state's law against
discrimination, the Washington Human Rights Commission was not empowered
"to award compensation for humiliation and mental suffering caused by unlawful
age discrimination." 641 P.2d at 169. The Spangenberg court held that a statute
must be read as a whole and that statutory intent is not "determined by a single
sentence ... or single phrase." Id. at 164 (citing State v. Fenter, 569 P.2d 67
(Wash. 1977)). Moreover, the court concluded that the phrase contained in the
statute authorizing the Commission "to take such other action" necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the law against discrimination did not, on its own,
confer authority on the Commission to award damages. Id. (referring to WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.250). Further, the court stated that there was no
express language in the statute conferring the Commission with such authority,
and that the legislative history indicated that the Legislature "did not want the
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The holdings of these cases indicate that by allowing the eight-
employee threshold governing the jurisdiction of the Human Rights
Commission to deprive the plaintiff in Griffin the right to pursue
a private action, the Washington Supreme Court rendered meaning-
less the provisions of the law against discrimination that grant an
unequivocal right to pursue a private action to redress alleged acts
of discrimination.' °3 The individual sections of a statute must be
read together and interpreted as a whole in order to effectuate
statutory purpose in accordance with the legislature's intent and
public policy considerations. The Griffin court's failure to give
effect to all the provisions of the law against discrimination had the
effect of subjecting the plaintiff in Griffin to a further violation of
her civil rights, as the court's holding deprived her of the unequiv-
ocal right conferred on all Washington citizens to redress in private
actions acts of employment discrimination.
E. A Misinterpretation of Key Statutory Language
The Griffin court's failure to give effect to the statutory
language granting only general jurisdiction to the Human Rights
Commission further demonstrates its flawed analysis.14 By
explicitly conferring on the Commission only general jurisdiction
to eliminate and prevent employment discrimination,' 5 rather
than exclusive purview, it appears that it was the Legislature's
intent to ensure that the administrative relief available through the
[Commission] to have the power to award damages for humiliation and mental
suffering for age discrimination violations." Id. at 166.
'03 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789 (Wash. 1996) (holding that individuals
employed in companies with fewer than eight employees may not pursue a
private action for discrimination despite the text of WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2), conferring an undeniable right on all Washington
citizens to bring such actions to protect their civil rights). See supra text
accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.020,
49.60.030(2)).
104 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (stating that the "commission
established hereunder is hereby given general jurisdiction and power" to
eliminate and prevent discrimination in employment).
'05 Seesupra note 104 (discussing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 and
its grant of "general" jurisdiction to the Human Rights Commission).
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Commission was not the sole method of recourse available to
individuals.0 6 Because the Commission was not granted exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims alleging discriminatory acts, the
Legislature granted employees in companies with fewer than eight
employees, who do not benefit from the limited jurisdiction of the
Human Rights Commission, the right to pursue a private cause of
action. 107
The court's imprudent statutory analysis is further demonstrated
by its disregard of the statute's inclusion of the word "any" in
defining who is entitled to the protections provided by the law
against discrimination.' °8 Generally, "any" means "every" and
"all,"109 which, if interpreted accurately, includes persons who
106 Compare the definition of "general jurisdiction" with the definition of
"exclusive jurisdiction." While the term "general jurisdiction" applies to the
ability of a court or agency to adjudicate "all controversies that may be brought
* . .within the legal bounds of rights and remedies," this definition does not
connote exclusive jurisdiction over a particular controversy or subject area.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 684 (6th ed. 1990). "Exclusive jurisdiction,"
conversely, is the "power which a court or other tribunal exercises over an action
or over a person to the exclusion of all other courts" and "[t]hat forum in which
an action must be commenced because no other forum has the jurisdiction to hear
and determine the action." Id. at 564.
107 See supra note 104 (discussing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010
(West 1990 & Supp. 1998) and the grant of general jurisdiction to the Human
Rights Commission); supra note 106 (discussing the definitions of "general" and
"exclusive" jurisdiction).
108 See supra text accompanying note 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.030(2)), which confers on "[a]ny person deeming himself or herself
injured by any act in violation of [the law against discrimination]" the right to
pursue a civil action to protect his or her civil rights); supra text accompanying
note 2 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020, which states that nothing
contained in the law against discrimination "shall ... be construed to deny the
right to any person" to bring a private action to remedy or enjoin civil rights
violations). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 (stating that "[t]he
legislature hereby finds and declares that practices of discrimination against any
of its inhabitants ... threatens not only the rights and proper privileges of its
inhabitants but menaces the institutions and foundation of a free democratic
state").
'09 See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 61 (3d ed. 1991)
(defining "any" as "[o]ne, some, every, or all without specification").
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work for companies with fewer than eight employees.11° Without
explanation, the Griffin court rejected these statutory definitions,
and in doing so, allowed the limitations applicable to the jurisdic-
tion of the Human Rights Commission to limit the unequivocal
right to private action conferred in the law against discrimina-
tion. l'
F A Repudiation of the Statutory Mandate of Liberal
Construction
Contributing to the court's erroneous holding in Griffin was its
repudiation of the mandate of the law against discrimination stating
that its anti-discrimination provisions be liberally construed in order
to accomplish the law's purpose of eradicating discrimination.12
The Griffin holding, which deprives a significant percentage of the
state's citizenry the right to seek redress for alleged civil rights
violations,"3 demonstrates anything but the liberal construction
mandated by the statute. 4 Instead, the Griffin decision inexplica-
bly evidences the very broad application of statutory exceptions to
the law against discrimination that the Washington Supreme Court
110 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 796 (Wash. 1996) (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (discussing WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.020,49.60.030(2)); supra note 108 (discussing WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.010 and the statute's explicit reference to "any person" and
"any... inhabitants" of Washington).
. See Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789 (holding that "employers of fewer than eight
employees are statutorily exempt from [the] remedies provided under [the law
against discrimination]").
112 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020 (stating that "the provisions of
this chapter shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of the purposes
[of the law against discrimination]"); supra note 59 and accompanying text
(discussing id. § 49.60.010 and the purpose of the law against discrimination).
See also Burnside v. Simpson Paper Co., 864 P.2d 937, 940 (Wash. 1994)
(stating that the underlying purpose of the law against discrimination is "to deter
discrimination").
113 See supra note 8 (discussing the large percentage of employees in
Washington who work for companies with fewer than nine or ten employees).
"'4 See supra note 112 (discussing the statute's mandate of liberal construc-
tion pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020 (West 1990 & Supp.
1998)).
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previously prohibited. 15 Moreover, the holding demonstrated the
court's disregard for its own precedent mandating liberal construc-
tion of statutory safeguards against discrimination." 6
In Nucleonics Alliance v Washington Public Power Supply
System," 7 the Washington Supreme Court held that because the
purpose of the state statute governing public employees' right to
representation by labor organizations was remedial in nature, the
statute was "entitled to a liberal construction to effect its pur-
pose."" 8 The issues the court addressed in Nucleonics Alliance
.5 For example, in Phillips v. City of Seattle, the court held that statutory
safeguards against discrimination "are to be liberally construed" and "exceptions
narrowly confined." 766 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Wash. 1989). In Phillips, which
involved a wrongful discharge suit brought by an employee claiming that his
employer failed to accommodate his handicap, the Washington Supreme Court
interpreted the definition of handicap pursuant to the law against discrimination.
ld.
116 In its opinion, the Phillips court contrasted the emphasis of statutory
interpretation in law enforcement, which is "to leave no one out," with that of
affirmative action, which must "avoid including in so many persons that statistics
become meaningless." Phillips, 766 P.2d at 1102. The court reasoned that if the
narrow affirmative action definition of handicap were applied to cases involving
individual claims of discrimination, as it was applied by the lower court, a large
number of people would be impermissibly excluded from the protections afforded
by the statute. id. See also Marquis v. City of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 49 (Wash.
1996) (citing Shoreline Community College v. Employment Sec. Dep't, 842 P.2d
938 (Wash. 1992) (holding that "a statutory mandate of liberal construction
requires that [the court] view with caution any construction that would narrow
the coverage of the law")); Nucleonics Alliance v. Washington Pub. Power
Supply Sys., 677 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1984) (stating that "[a] policy requiring
liberal construction is a command that the coverage of an act's provisions be
liberally construed and that its exceptions be narrowly confined").
'17 677 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1984).
"8 Id. at 110. The court held that Washington's Public Employment
Relations Commission ("PERC") was required, under the state's Public
Employee's Collective Bargaining Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56 (West
1991), to process a collective bargaining election petition filed by the labor
organization Nucleonics on behalf of security guards employed by the
Washington Public Power Supply System. Nucleonics Alliance, 677 P.2d at 112.
Washington's Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act states that:
The intent and purpose of this chapter is to promote the continued
improvement of the relationship between public employers and their
employees by providing a uniform basis for implementing the right of
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were whether the Washington Public Power Supply System
("WPPSS"), a municipal corporation and joint operating agency
authorized to build and maintain power plants, was a public utility
district, and whether the state's Public Employment Relations
Commission ("PERC") had jurisdiction over "labor relations
between WPPSS and its employees, '1 9 pursuant to the state's
Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act. 2 ° The respondent
in Nucleonics Alliance, WPPSS, claimed that it was a public utility
district, and therefore, was exempt from the ambit of the Collective
Bargaining Act, pursuant to exceptions contained in the code
governing the rights and duties of public utility districts to enter
into collective bargaining with their employees."12
The Nucleonics Alliance court concluded that while "some of
the same powers and duties that are applicable to [public utility
districts]' ' 2 2 also apply to municipal corporations and joint
operating agencies, such as WPPSS, that fact "does not mandate
that WPPSS be considered a [public utility district] for the purposes
of an exception from [the Collective Bargaining Act].' 2 3 Reason-
ing that the declared purpose of the Public Employee's Collective
public employees to join labor organizations of their own choosing and
to be represented by such organizations in matters concerning their
employment relations with public employers.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.010.
119 Nucleonics Alliance, 677 P.2d at 110.
120 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.
121 Nucleonics Alliance, 677 P.2d at 110, 112. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 41.56.020 (stating that the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act "shall
apply to any county or municipal corporation, or any political subdivision of the
state of Washington ... except as otherwise provided by [Washington Revised
Code sections] 54.04.170, 54.04.180").
122 Nucleonics Alliance, 677 P.2d at 111.
23 Id. The Nucleonics Alliance court stated that:
Whereas the separate [public utility districts] are subject to the
exception of [section] . . . 41.56.020, municipalities [and municipal
organizations] which have an express grant of authority almost
identical to that of the [public utility districts] to construct, acquire and
operate electric generating facilities, are not subject to such exceptions
from [the Public Employees' Bargaining Act].
150
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Bargaining Act is the "implementation of the right of public
employees to join and be represented by labor organizations,'24
and recognizing that the Act was remedial in nature, the court
concluded that the statute was "entitled to a liberal construction to
effect its purpose."'' 25 Rejecting the claim of exemption asserted
by WPPSS, the court held that a "broad construction of the
exception ... from the covered class of municipal corporations
would not effect the purpose of providing the right of public
employees to join and be represented by labor organizations."' 26
Further, the Nucleonics Alliance court stated that "[i]n accordance
with the rules of statutory construction and the remedial na-
ture' 1 27 of the Act, WPPSS is not a public utility, and therefore,
is "not within the jurisdictional exception [of the law].' 28
Similarly, the law against discrimination is a remedial statute
that requires a liberal construction in order to effectuate its purpose
of protecting all Washington citizens against violations of their civil
rights. 29 The Griffin holding therefore repudiates Washington
Supreme Court precedent mandating that remedial statutes, such as
the law against discrimination, be liberally construed and their
exceptions narrowly confined.
G. The Denial of Rights Conferred by the Law Against
Discrimination
Washington's law against discrimination undeniably provides all
citizens the unequivocal right to pursue private actions to seek
redress for discriminatory acts allegedly committed by their
employers. 3 ° Moreover, a significant body of case law supports
the proposition that the statute contains a general ban on
124 Id. at 110.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 111.
127 Id. at 112.
128 Id. at 111.
129 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.020 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
130 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2), which confer an unequivocal right on every
Washington citizen to pursue a private action to protect his or her civil rights).
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discrimination and confers on all Washington citizens an absolute
right to be free of discrimination. 3'
On the same day it rendered its opinion in Griffin v Eller, the
Washington Supreme Court held in Marquis v City of Spokane that
definitions contained in the law against discrimination do not
foreclose the general right to pursue a private cause of action.'32
In Marquis, the plaintiff, an independent contractor, filed suit under
the law against discrimination, alleging sexual discrimination in
relation to her contract with the city of Seattle, Washington, to
manage a golf course.'33 The trial court dismissed the Marquis
,' See, e.g., Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wash. 1990) (holding
that allowing employees who work in companies with fewer than eight
employees to pursue private actions against their employers to defend their civil
rights will not undermine the purpose of exempting such employers from the
jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission); Spangenberg v. Cheney Sch.
Dist. No. 30, 641 P.2d 163, 166 (Wash. 1982) (holding that an alleged victim of
age discrimination may seek damages in a private action under the law against
discrimination notwithstanding that the complainant was foreclosed from
pursuing administrative remedies through the Human Rights Commission).
132 Marquis v. City of Spokane, 922 P.2d 43, 50 (Wash. 1996) (holding that
definitions in the law against discrimination that function to limit its scope do
not prevent citizens who allege to be victims of discrimination from pursuing
private actions to protect their civil rights). Both cases were decided on
September 5, 1996. See Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788 (Wash. 1996).
133 Marquis, 922 P.2d at 45-46. The Marquis plaintiff was a professional
golfer who had been hired by Seattle's Parks and Recreation Department as the
golf professional at one of the three golf courses it owned. Id. at 45. Marquis'
responsibilities included operation of the Downriver Golf Course, along with its
"practice range, pro shop, cafe, food services and clubhouse." Id. at 46. At the
time she negotiated her contract, Marquis was told that she "could expect a long
career ... and that her contract would be continually renewed so long as she
performed her job." Id.
During her tenure as golf professional, Marquis learned that she was
receiving less compensation than male golf professionals at the city's two other
golf courses. Id. When she addressed the City's golf manager about the pay
discrepancy, he replied by inquiring "why she was worried about it as she was
married to a doctor." Id. In addition, she was told by a member of the City's
golf committee that "[i]f you can't take the heat, get out of the kitchen." Id. In
addition, Marquis claimed that "she was subjected to discriminatory treatment
during the course" of her employment, including reprimands for minor violations
of her contract. Id. Marquis further alleged that her male counterparts at the other
municipal golf courses "were not similarly reprimanded" for comparable
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plaintiffs claim, reasoning that the state's law against discrimina-
tion did "not prohibit discrimination against independent contrac-
tors., 134 The court seemingly reasoned that the rights conferred
in the law against discrimination applied only to "employees,"
pursuant to the statutory definition of the term, and not to indepen-
dent contractors.13 ' The flawed reasoning applied by the trial
court in Marquis is analogous to that exercised in Griffin, where
the Washington Supreme Court relied on the statutory definition of
"employer" to limit the right to pursue private actions to individu-
als who work for employers with eight or more employees. 136
Like the plaintiff in Marquis, who was unable to seek adminis-
trative relief from Washington's Human Rights Commission
because of her status as an independent contractor, 137 Griffin was
also precluded from obtaining such relief, because she was unable
to allege that Eller was an employer, defined by the statute as
violations. Id. Finally, when the time came to renegotiate her contract, the City
"refused to unconditionally renew her contract" pursuant to the "reprimands in
her file." Id. Instead, Marquis was offered a "one-year probationary contract,"
which she refused. Id.
134 Id. at 47.
... Marquis, 922 P.2d at 47.
136 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
137 See Marquis, 922 P.2d at 51 (citing WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-
170(2) (1997), a rule promulgated by the Washington Human Rights Commis-
sion, which states that "[w]hile an independent contractors [sic] does not have the
protection of [seeking administrative relief from the Commission, pursuant to
section 49.60.180], the contractor is protected by" the statutory provision
granting a general right to private action to any person who deems himself or
herself a victim of discrimination prohibited by the statute). See supra text
accompanying note 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2) (West
1990 & Supp. 1998)). The Marquis court stated that while the definition of
"employee" contained in the law against discrimination did not specifically
address independent contractors, it "presume[d] the legislature intended" the
definition to distinguish "between employees and independent contractors, based
primarily on the degree of control exercised by the employer/principal over the
manner of doing the work involved." Marquis, 922 P.2d at 50 (citing Fardig v.
Reynolds, 348 P.2d 661 (Wash. 1960)). The law against discrimination states that
"[e]mployee does not include any individual employed by his or her parents,
spouse, or child, or in the domestic service of any person." WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.040(4).
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someone who employs eight or more persons. 38 However, in
Marquis, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court
decision and held that the general right to commence a private
action pursuant to the law against discrimination is enforceable
regardless of the availability of administrative relief.3 9 The
Marquis court correctly recognized that the definitions contained in
the law against discrimination, which function to limit the
138 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. Pursuant to the law against discrimination,
Griffin was unable to allege an unfair practice and seek administrative relief
because her employer did not meet the statutory criteria of who an "employer"
is, as he employed fewer than eight employees. Id. See supra text accompanying
note 23 (discussing the definition of "employer" pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.040(3)).
' Marquis, 922 P.2d at 50 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1))
(holding that the law against discrimination "does not foreclose a cause of action
to an independent contractor because, by its own terms [the statute] does not
limit the actions which may be brought to those listed in the statute"). See supra
text accompanying note 1 (quoting id. § 49.60.030(1) and its recognition that
"[t]he right to be free of [employment] discrimination" is a "civil right"). See
also Bennett v. Hardy, 784 P.2d 1258, 1266 (Wash. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs
who sued their former employer alleging age discrimination and wrongful
discharge were not precluded from pursuing private actions under the state's
unfair employment practice statute, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.44.090 (West
1990 & Supp. 1998), notwithstanding that plaintiffs were barred from seeking
administrative relief from the Washington Human Rights Commission because
their employer did not satisfy the definition of employer contained in the law
against discrimination). Whilethe Bennett court adjudicated the right of plaintiffs
to sue in private actions pursuant to a statute other than the law against
discrimination, the court set forth the following proposition regarding the broad
availability of the right to pursue civil actions to redress alleged acts of
discrimination:
The purposes announced by the Commission for exempting small
businesses from regulation will in no way be interfered with by
permitting private causes of action against employers whose size keeps
them outside the scope of public agency regulation. Moreover,
permitting private actions by individual plaintiffs can only assist the
Commission in furthering the goal of preventing and eliminating
employment discrimination.
Bennett, 784 P.2d at 1266.
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jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission, do not alter the
unequivocal nature of the right to a private action.' 40
In light of the court's holding in Marquis, it is clear that the
plaintiff in Griffin, who was not entitled to seek administrative
relief under the law against discrimination, was entitled to bring a
private action to defend her civil rights, just as the Marquis
plaintiff was. 14 1 It is difficult to understand why the Washington
Supreme Court would enunciate in Marquis the proposition that
definitions in the law against discrimination do not foreclose the
general right to pursue a private action, and simultaneously reject
that same proposition in Griffin.142 The policy set forth in
Marquis, demonstrating the value that the Washington Supreme
Court placed on protecting a citizen's right to defend his or her
civil rights in a private action, 143 is sufficiently significant to
extend to individuals such as Griffin.
Similar to its holding in Marquis, the Washington Supreme
Court held in Spangenberg v Cheney School District No. 30144
that an alleged victim of discrimination was entitled to seek
compensatory damages in a private action pursuant to the law
against discrimination, notwithstanding her foreclosure from
140 Marquis, 922 P.2d at 50. See also Michael Spiro, Judicial Deference to
A dministrative Construction of Washington's Law Against Discrimination: Griffin
v. Eller and Marquis v. City of Spokane, 72 WASH. L. REV. 677, 695 (1997).
Spiro states that in Marquis, the Washington Supreme Court held that the civil
rights protected by the law against discrimination were "nonexclusive," and that
the statute must be "interpreted in the manner that best fulfills the legislative
purpose and intent." Id. Spiro states further that "the court acknowledged that no
person may be denied the right to bring a cause of action based on a 'violation
of his or her civil rights,' and that it must 'view with caution' constructions that
'narrow the coverage of the law."' Id. (quoting Marquis, 922 P.2d at 49).
141 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of the
Washington Supreme Court in Marquis, 922 P.2d at 53).
142 Compare Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789 (holding that "employers of fewer than
eight employees are statutorily exempt from these remedies provided under [the
law against discrimination]"); with Marquis, 922 P.2d at 49 (holding that the
definitions contained in the law against discrimination do not limit the general
right to pursue a private action).
113 See Marquis, 922 P.2d at 50.
144 641 P.2d 163 (Wash. 1982).
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pursuing such relief through the Commission. 145 Interpreting the
administrative code defining the practices and procedures of the
Commission, the court reasoned that the law against discrimination
"preserves the civil and criminal remedies of a person who has
filed a complaint ... and . . . authorizes suits directly in court, in
order to free the commission to work for the remedy best designed
to eliminate and prevent discrimination. "146 Recognizing the
public policy goals embodied in the law against discrimination, the
Spangenberg court protected the unequivocal right of all
Washington citizens to pursue a private action in defense of their
civil rights. 141
141 Id. at 166 (stating that plaintiff alleging age discrimination may seek
redress under section 49.60.030 of the Revised Code of Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 1990 & Supp. 1998) "which specifically grants
a civil remedy for anyone injured by an act of discrimination"). The court held
that the plaintiff in Spangenberg was precluded from seeking damages through
the Human Rights Commission for mental suffering incurred as a result of
alleged age discrimination because the statute does not authorize the Commission
to award damages. Id. at 169. See supra text accompanying note 3 (quoting
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2), which confers the right to pursue a
civil action on "[a]ny person deeming himself or herself injured by" an act of
discrimination).
146 Spangenberg, 641 P.2d at 166 (citing WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 49.60.020). See supra text accompanying note 2 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.020, which confers an unequivocal right on every Washington
citizen to pursue a private remedy to protect his or her civil rights). See WASH.
ADMIN. CODE § 162-08-061(2) (1997) (stating that "[t]he [Human Rights
Commission's] primary objective is to eliminate and prevent discrimination").
The administrative code provides that "[t]he commission assumes that persons
who complain to it are as interested in the elimination and prevention of
discrimination in general as in their individual cases" and that "[i]f a person is
interested only in relief for himself or herself, he or she is advised to seek his or
her remedy directly in court [pursuant to the law against discrimination]." Id.
The court in Spangenberg described the role of the Human Rights
Commission "as a 'fire department' designated to take immediate action in the
event of an emergency in the violation of civil rights, without fear of waiver of
other civil or criminal remedies." 641 P.2d at 166. Further, the Spangenberg
court stated that "[o]n the other hand, the courts supply the long-term stability
and reliability for enforcement of discrimination statutes that are violated, and
for the awarding of damages." Id.
47 See Spangenberg, 641 P.2d at 169 (holding that "[a] person who has
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It is difficult to reconcile the Washington Supreme Court's
holding in Spangenberg, which placed a high value on preserving
the right of individuals to protect their civil rights in private
actions,148 with the holding in Griffin. The complainants in
Griffin and Spangenberg are similar in that both individuals were
foreclosed from pursuing administrative relief through the Human
Rights Commission. 49 Both individuals, as Washington citizens,
also possessed the undeniable right to pursue a private action to
redress alleged violations of their civil rights afforded by the law
against discrimination. 50 Only the Griffin court's misinterpreta-
tion of the statutory definition of "employer," and its erroneous
extension of the jurisdictional limitations of the Human Rights
Commission, separate the holdings of the two cases. When the
applicable provisions of the law against discrimination are
interpreted together with the controlling case law, it is undeniable
that Griffin and all other citizens of Washington, who are precluded
from seeking administrative relief from the Human Rights Commis-
sion, do indeed have a right to protect their civil rights in a private
action.
suffered humiliation caused by discrimination may seek relief through a civil
action as provided for under [the law against discrimination]"); supra text
accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.020,
49.60.030(2)).
148 Spangenberg, 641 P.2d at 166.
141 See Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789-90 (Wash. 1996) (holding that
Griffin was foreclosed from seeking administrative relief because her employer
did not comport with the statutory definition of "employer"); Spangenberg, 641
P.2d at 164 (holding that the plaintiff was precluded from seeking damages
through the Human Rights Commission because the statute does not authorize the
Commission to award damages). See supra note 22 and accompanying text
(discussing the limited jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission to
adjudicate charges of employment discrimination pursuant to the definitions of
"employer" and "unfair practices" contained in the law against discrimination,
pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.60.120(4), 49.60.180(1)-(4)).
'So See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2), which confer an unequivocal right on every
Washington citizen to pursue a private action to protect his or her civil rights).
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H. A Disregard for the Administrative Code Created to
Enforce the Law Against Discrimination
The court's erroneous holding in Griffin is further demonstrated
by its flawed interpretation of the administrative code created to
implement the law against discrimination. 5 ' In rejecting Griffin's
argument that the small business exemption frustrates the statute's
purpose, 52 the Washington Supreme Court ignored key provi-
sions in the code, stating that "[t]he standards in this section do not
define who is entitled to the protection of the law against discrimi-
nation." '153
The primary purpose of the administrative code exemption
limiting the Commission's enforcement authority to employers
included within the statutory definition is to "relieve small
businesses of a regulatory burden."'5 4 Further, "[iln the interest
of cost effectiveness," the exemption "confine[s] public agency
enforcement of the law to employers whose practices affect a
substantial number of persons." ''  This language gives no
indication that the purpose of the exemption is to deprive employ-
ees of companies with fewer than eight employees of the right to
pursue a private action.156
The statute's exemption of companies with fewer than eight
employees from the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Commission
is motivated by the critical goal of reducing the state government's
administrative burden by excluding from its regulatory control the
... WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 162-16-160(1)(2) (1997) (implementing the
section of the statute that defines employer as "any person ...who employs
eight or more persons" and establishes "standards for determining who is counted
as employed when deciding whether a person is an employer under the quoted
language").
152 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 792.
' WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-160(1).
114 Id. § 162-16-160(2)(a). See Griffin, 922 P.2d at 802 (Talmadge, J.,
dissenting) (stating that it is the Commission's view that "the exemption only
confines public agency enforcement of the law, and does not restrict the scope
of the law itself').
5 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-160(2)(b).
56 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-160(2)(a), (b).
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significant percentage of small businesses that operate in the
state. 157 The exemption also furthers an important public policy
objective by reducing the cost of doing business for small business-
es, which, in turn, spurs economic growth and creates jobs in the
state. 58 However, there is no justification for sacrificing the
unequivocal right of all Washington citizens to protect their civil
rights through private actions as a means for realizing these
policies.
One of the concerns that motivated the Griffin court was that by
allowing individuals employed by companies with fewer than eight
employees to sue in private actions, the number of lawsuits filed
against small businesses might significantly increase. 59 Pursuant
to the court's reasoning, small businesses would incur significant
costs as a consequence of providing a broad right to private action
through the law against discrimination.
However, the Griffin court's concerns are unfounded in light of
data compiled by two municipal human rights organizations in
Washington whose jurisdiction over employment discrimination
complaints is broader than that conferred on the state's Human
Rights Commission by the law against discrimination. In Tacoma,
the city's Human Rights Department is responsible for "[r]eceiving,
investigating, and seeking the satisfactory adjustment of complaints
charging unlawful practices as set forth" in the city's administrative
code. 6 ° Included under the Department's jurisdiction is the
adjudication of "unlawful discriminatory practices" committed by
"employers," as these terms are defined by the code.'61 The
157 See supra note 8 (discussing the significant percentage of Washington
citizens employed in small companies).
118 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 792 (analyzing the rationale behind the small
business exemption, the court explained that "the State has a substantial interest
in the well-being of small business with regard to the state economy, tax base,
and opportunities for employment").
9 Id. at 791-92. The court stated that "the Legislature may well have been
advancing legitimate state purposes by . . . protecting small businesses from
private litigation expense." Id. at 791. The Griffin court failed, however, to
support these concerns with any statistical evidence addressing the number of
private actions filed against employers of fewer than eight individuals. Id.
160 TACOMA, WASH. CODE § 1.29.030(A)(1) (1994).
161 Id. § 1.29.050.
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Tacoma code defines employer as "any person [or partnership,
organization or corporation] ... acting in the interests of an
employer ... who has any person in his, her or its employ.' ' 62
The second organization, the Seattle Office for Civil Rights, is
empowered, pursuant to the city's ordinance governing employment
practices, to "investigate, and pass upon charges alleging unfair
[employment] practices.' ' 63 Seattle's employment law defines
"employer" as "any person who has four (4) or more employ-
ees."'
164
Although the Tacoma Human Rights Department is authorized
to adjudicate discrimination charges filed by individuals employed
in companies with one or more employees, 65 the number of
employment discrimination charges that are filed by individuals
employed in companies with fewer than eight employees is
negligible. 66 Similarly, in Seattle, where the right of employees
162 ld. § 1.29.040(E).
163 SEATTLE, WASH. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ORDINANCE § 14.04.060(A)
(1997). See id. § 14.04.040 (defining the unfair employment practices over which
the Office has jurisdiction to adjudicate).
164 Id. § 14.04.030(H).
165 See supra text accompanying notes 160-162 (discussing the jurisdiction
of the Department over employment discrimination claims pursuant to the code's
definition of "employer," pursuant to TACOMA, WASH. CODE §§ 1.29.030(A)(1),
1.29.040(E), 1.29.050 (1994)).
166 According to Allen Correll, Executive Director of the Tacoma Human
Rights Department, out of 100 employment discrimination charges filed with the
Department in any given year, it is rare to have more than "a handful" of charges
of employment discrimination filed by employees in companies with fewer than
eight employees. Telephone Interview with Allen Correll, Executive Director of
the Tacoma Human Rights Department (Nov. 21, 1997). In 1995, less than 2%
of the 113 charges alleging employment discrimination were filed by individuals
employed in companies with fewer than eight employees. Letter from Judy
Lampson, Administrative Secretary of the Tacoma Human Rights Department
(Oct. 6, 1998) (on file with the Journal of Law and Policy); Telephone interview
with Judy Lampson (Sept. 24, 1998). In 1996, the number of such complaints
received by the Department was seven, which represents 7.3% of the 95
complaints received in total by the Department. Letter from Judy Lampson (Oct.
6, 1998); Telephone Interview with Judy Lampson (Sept. 24, 1998). Of the 93
employment discrimination complaints received by the Department in 1997, the
five complaints filed by employees in companies with fewer than eight
employees represent 5.3% of the total number of complaints filed. Letter from
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to pursue administrative relief for alleged discrimination is also
broad, 167 the percentage of complaints filed by employees such
as Griffin, is likewise insignificant.
68
While these statistics apply only to the percentage of complaints
seeking administrative relief, they are enlightening because they
demonstrate that, notwithstanding the broad right to pursue such
relief in these municipalities, the number of complaints filed by
employees in companies with fewer than eight employees remains
negligible. Extrapolating the data compiled by the Tacoma Human
Rights Department and the Seattle Office for Civil Rights on the
number of employment discrimination charges filed by employees
in companies with fewer than eight employees,'69 it is reasonable
to conclude that the number of private actions that would be filed
under the law against discrimination by employees in companies
with fewer than eight employees would be similarly insignificant.
Consequently, permitting these employees to exercise their
unequivocal right to pursue private actions to defend their civil
rights is fully justified. 70
Judy Lampson (Oct. 6, 1998); Telephone Interview with Judy Lampson (Sept.
24, 1998). As of September 30, 1998, 63 complaints alleging employment
discrimination have been filed with the Department. Letter from Judy Lampson
(Oct. 6, 1998). Of those complaints, five have been filed by employees in
companies with fewer than eight employees, representing less than 8% of the
total complaints filed. Id.
167 See supra notes 163 and 164 and accompanying text (discussing
SEATTLE, WASH. EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ORDINANCE §§ 14.04.030(H),
14.04.040, 14.04.060(A) (1997) and the jurisdiction of the city's Office for Civil
Rights over employment discrimination claims pursuant to the ordinance's
definition of employer).
68 In 1997, one charge of employment discrimination was filed with the
Seattle Office for Civil Rights by an individual employed in a company with
fewer than eight employees. Letters from Mary Jane Brogan, Legal Assistant,
Seattle Office for Civil Rights (Oct. 19, 1998; Oct. 30, 1998) (on file with the
Journal of Law and Policy). Of the 90 employment discrimination complaints
received by the Office from private employers in 1997, the one charge filed by
an employee in a company with fewer than eight employees accounts for less
than 1% of the total number of complaints filed. Id.
69 See supra notes 166 and 168 and accompanying text.
70 According to Allen Correll, "there is not a preponderance of cases nor
any statistical facts supporting a contention that allowing employees of small
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III. VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
INHERENT IN THE GRIFFIN DECISION
The Griffin court established two separate and unequal criteria
for determining who has a right to redress alleged acts of employ-
ment discrimination.17 1 In so doing, the Washington Supreme
Court summarily deprived one group of citizens-those employed
in companies with fewer than eight employees-of a means to
defend themselves against alleged violations of their civil
rights. 72 At the same time, the court affirmed that citizens
employed in companies with eight or more employees have a
substantial means to defend against such abuses. 1
13
Further, the Griffin court provided a special privilege to owners
of small businesses by exempting them from the burden of
complying with the law against discrimination. 74 Pursuant to the
court's holding, this burden has been imposed exclusively on
companies with eight or more employees. 75 As a result of its
disparate treatment of citizens employed in companies with fewer
than eight employees, and its unequal treatment of their employers,
the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Griffin violated the
privileges and immunities clause of Washington's constitution.17 6
The privileges and immunities clause of Washington's constitu-
tion prohibits any law from granting to any citizen or corporation,
companies to sue in private actions to redress alleged acts of discrimination
would significantly increase the burden on state courts." Telephone Interview
with Allen Correll, Executive Director of the City of Tacoma Human Rights
Department (Nov. 21, 1997).
,'1 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 791 (Wash. 1996) (holding that applying
the anti-discrimination statute unequally is permissible because "the legislature
may constitutionally approach the problem of employment discrimination one
step at a time").
172 Id. at 789 (holding that "employers of fewer than eight employees are
statutorily exempt from [the] remedies provided under [the law against
discrimination]" and that "the exemption passes constitutional muster").
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
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except municipal corporations, "privileges or immunities which
upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens."' 77
The safeguards inherent in the privileges and immunities clause
prohibit the type of disparate statutory enforcement advanced by
the Griffin court, which held that "employers of fewer than eight
employees are statutorily exempt from [the] remedies provided
under [the law against discrimination]. In light of its holdings
in numerous cases adjudicating alleged violations of the state
constitution's privileges and immunities clause, 7 9 the Washington
Supreme Court repudiated established precedent and eschewed the
principles of stare decisis when it affirmed the trial court's holding
in Griffin.'8" This precedent established by the court enunciates
177 id.
17' Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
"9' See, e.g., Adams v. Hinkle, 322 P.2d 844, 857 (Wash. 1958) (holding that
a state statute that criminalized the sale of comic books but exempted from the
statute's coverage the sale of newspapers with comic sections violated the
privileges and immunities clause); City of Seattle v. Rogers, 106 P.2d 598, 601
(Wash. 1940) (holding that a Seattle ordinance that required all businesses that
solicit charitable contributions to obtain licenses violated the privileges and
immunities clause because it provided an exemption to one organization);
Sherman Clay v. Brown, 231 P. 166, 168 (Wash. 1924) (deeming violative of the
privileges and immunities clause a Seattle ordinance that exempted dealers of one
type of second-hand goods from a licensing requirement that was imposed on all
other dealers of second-hand goods); State v. Robinson, 146 P. 628, 629 (Wash.
1915) (determining that a state statute that exempted one type of food producer
from a requirement to record sales while imposing that obligation on other food
producers violated the privileges and immunities clause). See Jonathan
Thompson, The Washington Constitution's Prohibition on Special Privileges and
hnmunities. Real Bite for "Equal Protection "Review of Regulatory Legislation,
69 TEMP. L. REV. 1247, 1273-76 (1996) (discussing the aforementioned cases).
"So Griffin, 922 P.2d at 793. For example, in State v. Martin, the court held
that stare decisis "makes for stability and permanence... [and implies] that a
rule once declared is and shall be the law." 384 P.2d 833, 845 (Wash. 1963).
Further, the Martin court stated that "[t]he very ideal of equal justice under law,
and the aspiration that one man shall be treated exactly like every other man
under the same circumstances depends upon [the principle of stare decisis]." Id.
By holding that Griffin's employer, and all other employers with fewer than
eight employees, were exempt from the remedies provided in the law against
discrimination, the Griffin court granted the very immunity from regulation it had
prohibited in its prior holdings. Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789. Consequently, it is
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a clear prohibition against granting regulatory immunity to certain
individuals or groups while excluding others, because such
immunity constitutes a violation of the privileges and immunities
clause. For example, in Adams v. Hinkle,' 81 the Washington
Supreme Court held that the Comic Book Act, a statute requiring
comic book dealers to obtain a pre-publication license, was invalid
under the privileges and immunities clause of Washington's
constitution. 82 The Adams court reasoned that because the statute
exempted from the licensing requirement regularly published
newspapers with comic sections, 8 3 it did not meet state constitu-
tional muster because it "exact[ed] from dealers in comic books a
prepublication license while immunizing newspapers from the same
requirements in the publication and distribution of the identical
materials." 84
In holding that the Comic Book Act was violative of the
privileges and immunities clause, the Adams court stated that the
purpose of the clause was "'to secure equality of treatment of all
persons without undue favor on the one hand or hostile discrimina-
tion on the other."' '" 8 5 Pursuant to the Adams' court analysis of
reasonable to conclude that by repudiating the precedent established in these
preceding cases, the court in Griffin eroded some of the "stability and perma-
nence" fostered by the principle of stare decisis. See Martin, 384 P.2d at 845.
's' 322 P.2d 844 (Wash. 1958).
812 Id at 857-58. The Comic Book Act declared that comic books "are a
factor in juvenile delinquency" and deemed criminal the "sale of comic books or
possession thereof with intent to sell without a prior license." Adams, 322 P.2d
at 846-47 (citing 1955 Wash. Laws, ch. 282). The statute defined comics as
"drawings depicting or telling a story of a real or fanciful event or series of
events" and stated that "no comic section of any regularly published daily or
weekly newspaper shall be deemed to be a 'comic book' for the purposes of this
act." Id. at 847. See Thompson, supra note 179, at 1275-76 (analyzing the
court's holding in Adams, 322 P.2d at 858).
.83 Adams, 322 P.2d at 847 (citing 1955 Wash. Laws 282 §§ 3-4).
184 Id. at 858.
85 Adams, 322 P.2d at 858 (citing Bacich v. Huse, 59 P.2d 1101 (Wash.
1936), overruled by Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass'n v. Moos, 603 P.2d 819, 824
(Wash. 1979)). The Adams court relied on the reasoning exhibited by the court
in Bacich to conclude that the Comic Book Act violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the state constitution, because it immunized newspapers
with comic sections from the licensing regulation imposed on comic book
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the privileges and immunities clause, it is apparent that the
Washington Supreme Court's holding in Griffin violates the
clause. 8 6 By depriving individuals employed in companies with
fewer than eight employees of the unequivocal right to private
action conferred in the law against discrimination,'87 the Griffin
court subjected Griffin to the "hostile discrimination" in statutory
enforcement proscribed by the privileges and immunities
clause. 11 Moreover, the Griffin holding granted "undue favor,"
in violation of the privileges and immunities clause, to individuals
employed in companies with eight or more employees by preserv-
ing their right to redress employment discrimination pursuant to the
law against discrimination.'S
Similarly, in City of Seattle v Rogers," ° the Washington
Supreme Court held violative of the privileges and immunities
clause a Seattle ordinance exempting the Seattle Community Fund,
a charitable organization,' 9 ' from a requirement that businesses
that solicit charitable contributions obtain a license in order to be
compensated for money they raise.'92 The court concluded that
because the licensing requirement applied to every business or
individual involved in charitable fundraising, the exemption of the
Seattle Community Trust was based arbitrarily on the fact that the
dealers. Id. Bacich, on the other hand, addressed the constitutionality of a
Washington law that regulated the rights of individuals and corporations in the
state to fish in Puget Sound with gill nets. 59 P.2d at 1102-03. The holding of
Bacich was overruled on the basis of the constitutionality of the state's regulation
of fishermen, an issue that was not considered by the Adams court. Puget Sound
Gillnetters Ass 'n, 603 P.2d at 824.
86 See supra text accompanying note 177 (discussing the purpose of the
Washington constitution's privileges and immunities clause).
187 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998)).
'8 See Adams, 322 P.2d at 858.
189 See id.
'90 106 P.2d 598 (Wash. 1940).
'9' Id. at 600.
92 Id. at 600-01. See Thompson, supra note 179, at 1274 (noting the
discriminatory impact of a Seattle ordinance that made it unlawful for every
fundraising organization, except the Seattle Community Fund, to conduct charity
campaigns where part of the proceeds of the campaign were withheld as
compensation unless campaign promoters obtained a costly license).
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Trust had a sympathetic mission or considerable political
strength.193 In light of the precedent established in Rogers and
Adams, which clearly prohibit the enactment of any law that would
result in one individual or group receiving privileges or immunities
that others are deprived of, the Washington Supreme Court's
holding in Griffin is flawed.
The Griffin holding deprived Griffin and all others who had the
misfortune of working in companies with fewer than eight
employees of the undeniable right to sue in a private action to
defend their civil rights. 94 Yet, employees who work in larger
companies retain that right. 95 The right of all citizens to defend
their civil rights in a private action is conferred on every
Washington citizen without equivocation by the law against
discrimination and is protected by the privileges and immunities
clause of Washington's constitution.19' As a result of its disparate
application of the law against discrimination, the Griffin court
eliminated the protection of this right embodied in the privileges
and immunities clause.1 97 Consequently, individuals employed in
companies with fewer than eight employees are left powerless to
'93 Rogers, 106 P.2d at 600. Two other holdings of the Washington Supreme
Court support the proposition that exempting some businesses from a regulation
while enforcing it against others implicates rights protected by the privileges and
immunities clause. See Sherman Clay v. Brown, 231 P. 166, 168 (Wash. 1924);
State v. Robinson, 146 P. 628, 629 (Wash. 1915). In Sherman Clay, the court
held that a Seattle ordinance that required second-hand goods dealers to be
licensed and keep records violated the privileges and immunities clause because
the ordinance exempted those merchants who dealt in "stoves, furniture or total
contents of any room or house." Sherman Clay, 231 P. at 168. In Robinson, the
court deemed violative of the privileges and immunities clause a statute that
required recording of sale of concentrated commercial foodstuffs, while
exempting cereal and flour mills from the recording requirement. 146 P. at 629.
See also, Thompson, supra note 179, at 1273-76 (discussing the aforementioned
cases).
'94 Griffin v. Eller, 922 P.2d 788, 789 (Wash. 1996) (holding that
"employers of fewer than eight employees are statutorily exempt from [the]
remedies provided under [the law against discrimination]").
195 Id.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 2 and 3 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 49.60.020, 49.60.030(2)); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
197 Griffin, 922 P.2d at 789.
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redress discriminatory acts pursuant to the law against discrimina-
tion, in violation of the privileges and immunities clause.
In the cases previously discussed, the Washington Supreme
Court illustrated its commitment to ensuring that no business or
commercial enterprise receives an unfair advantage due to legisla-
tion that provides privileges or benefits that are not granted equally
to all businesses. 98 Considering that the rights the court protected
in these cases related to unfettered competition in the business
arena, a strong policy argument can be made that the significance
the court attached to these important rights should have been
extended to the plaintiff in Griffin. In fact, preventing unequal
administration of the law in order to protect individual human
rights, such as the right to work in an environment free from sexual
harassment, is a value as significant as preventing unequal
administration of the law to ensure uninhibited competition in
business.199
CONCLUSION
It is clear that Sharon Griffin, and all Washington citizens
employed in companies with fewer than eight employees, have an
unequivocal right to pursue a private action to protect their civil
rights-even though they are barred statutorily from pursuing relief
through the state's Human Rights Commission. Pursuant to the
significant body of case law interpreting the law against discrimina-
tion, the administrative code created to implement it, and the rules
of statutory interpretation mandating liberal construction of
'9' Adams v. Hinkle, 322 P.2d 844, 858 (Wash. 1958); City of Seattle v.
Rogers, 106 P.2d 598, 600-01 (Wash. 1940); Sherman Clay, 231 P. at 168;
Robinson, 146 P. at 629.
'99 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(l)(a) (stating that "[t]he right
to be free of discrimination ... is recognized as and declared to be a civil right
... [and] shall include but not be limited to: [t]he right to obtain and hold
employment without discrimination"); Glasgow v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 693
P.2d 708, 711 (Wash. 1985) (holding that sexual harassment "unfairly handicaps
an employee against whom it is directed in his or her work performance and as
such is a barrier to sexual equality in the workplace").
167
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remedial laws, it is evident that the majority opinion in Griffin
lacks merit.
The Griffin holding is distressing for numerous reasons. First,
the decision frustrates the law's express purpose of protecting the
people of the state of Washington by fulfilling "the provisions of
the Constitution . . . concerning civil rights." 00 Second, the
holding in Griffin had the effect of perpetuating the discrimination
already suffered by the plaintiff. By depriving Griffin of the right
to seek redress in a private action, the court subjected her to further
discrimination based purely on the size of the company in which
she worked.
Third, the Griffin holding has far-reaching implications and
potentially disturbing precedential impact. Because the law against
discrimination also prohibits discrimination in employment based
on "age ... marital status, race, creed, color, national origin" and
"mental, or physical disabilit[ies], ' 0' it follows that individuals
working in companies with fewer than eight employees alleging to
have suffered discrimination based on these other factors would
likewise be prohibited from protecting their civil rights in a private
action.
Undoubtedly, the Griffin holding establishes troublesome policy,
as it provides immunity from the remedies conferred in the law
against discrimination to employers with fewer than eight employ-
ees. It is reasonable to conclude that the policy established in
Griffin may result in a significant increase in the incidence of all
types of discrimination suffered by individuals employed in
companies with fewer than eight employees, since their employers
will not be held accountable for their discriminatory conduct.
Indeed, the Griffin decision has the potential to destroy the
substantial anti-discrimination policy established in the state of
Washington to protect its citizens' civil rights.
200 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.010.
211 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(1) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998).
